ITVx Issues

[Harry Bloomfield]

Anyway, back to the story - I'd like to see Vennells lose her CBE.

Even better, locked up for a spell for her mismanagement.

 

[motorbiking]

FAW appoints Post Office director who 'misled court'

Angela van den Bogerd has been appointed head of people at the Football Association of Wales.

www.bbc.co.uk

I think that might be more applicable to the above. I think she lost the above job and is now an independent HR consultant.

 

[Roy Bloom]

There is certainly enough technical detail in the judgement for anyone to work out it wasn't a platform issue.

You're suggesting it was deliberate altering of transactions by the PO or Fujitsu to demonise the subpostpeople?
That's highly unlikely.
You'll need to provide some evidence for your allegation to have any credibility.
And I mean specific quotes from the judgement that you think supports your theory, not some vague suggestion like your usual, "read the judgement".
But your normal 'reading between the lines' has proven to be unfounded before.

Others may be interested:

https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/bates-v-post-office-appendix-1-1.pdf

https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/bates-v-post-office-appendix-2-1.pdf

Thanks for those. But one issue jumps right, to me. If there was no problem with the system (and I'm referring to the whole platform and network), why was the Hoirizon system discontinued?

Even today you will find plenty of businesses who do not integrate their payment system to the their finance system.

Assuming you are talking about wages & salaries and expenditure then of course. It's only at the accounting stage, cash-flow, Incme V expenditure, etc that the two come togather.

e.g. contactless charges are manually entered on the pad and the account payment marked paid. It's easy to ring up one charge and debit another.

Now you're conflating the transactions of a finance house, which is different to your previous separation of income v expenditure.

 

[Mottie]

Another thread taken off-topic by Bloomer.

 

[Roy Bloom]

Another thread taken off-topic by Bloomer.

An allegation targeted at me specifically again.
Another demonstration of your 'vendetta' attitude.

Now you've turned the thread into another topic.

Let's look at your allegation:
The original topic was problems with a ITVx.
Which was pretty much totally covered in the first two pages.
Until MBK commented especially on the Bates programme.

was an absolute awesome series. such a terrible miscarriage of justice. There is a great write up in Computer Weekly

Post Office Horizon scandal explained: Everything you need to know | Computer Weekly

Computer Weekly has investigated the Post Office Horizon scandal since 2008 and is, in fact, part of the story. This guide covers essential information about the scandal.

www.computerweekly.com

I would make one observation - anyone has the power to bring a private prosecution, it's just that the CPS has the power to take them over and discontinue them. Something it typically does when the alleged victims bring the case... but not in the case of the post office.

But you said not a word.
I also mentioned the Bates programme especially:

I watched Bates V PO last night, streamed via t'internet.

I was gobsmacked at several issues in the system installed.
In the late 1980's, I became aware of an unofficial 'overs and unders' cash box kept in the safe at an establishment under my control.
I happened to be there as they were closing, and the cashier brought it my attention that the day's shortfall was more than was available in the 'overs and unders' cashbox.

I stopped that practice immediately at all sites under my control for several reasons.
It was not official policy, it was not in the JD, it was not in the contract of Employment, and in my opinion encouraged the potential for dishonesty, and it removed an important Performance Measure.
From then on, it was a bank the overs and bank the unders. It's for the organisation to stand any loss, etc, not the employees.
I did get a lot of flack from my line manager, but my policy was established throughout the chain.
Later in the mid 90's I was responsible for a system for centralising performance data, which at that time was only establishment specific. But I designed and collected the information using dial-up and an Excel spreadsheet. The macro used to take a couple of hours to run.

Later in the run up to the millenium I was responsible for introduction of a new system, and I specified that the system must allow a cash-up and declaration of the 'takings' before indicating what the takings should be. This was to avoid an unofficial 'overs and unders' float.

But even then there were sufficient error checking processes and proceedings to avoid network outages to create errors.

The Post Office Horizon system was fundamentally and massively flawed. The technicality and the logicality existed to avoid such issues.

And still not a word from you.
Then MBK took a leaf out of your book, to coontinue his vendetta:

Still not a word from you.
So I reponded to MBK, still not a word from you, etc..


Now you accuse me of changing the topic, which you have also just done.
It's always someone else's fault, that someone else always being someone with whom you have started a vendetta. It's never your fault.
You really are a vexatious sort.

 

[Mottie]

Yawn. You should change your name to Charlie Brown.

 

[Roy Bloom]

Yawn. You should change your name to Charlie Brown.

You can be snoopy, it suits your stalking mentatlity.

 

[Brigadier]

Or Charlie Bronson

 

[motorbiking]

You're suggesting it was deliberate altering of transactions by the PO or Fujitsu to demonise the subpostpeople?
That's highly unlikely.
You'll need to provide some evidence for your allegation to have any credibility.
And I mean specific quotes from the judgement that you think supports your theory, not some vague suggestion like your usual, "read the judgement".
But your normal 'reading between the lines' has proven to be unfounded before.



Thanks for those. But one issue jumps right, to me. If there was no problem with the system (and I'm referring to the whole platform and network), why was the Hoirizon system discontinued?



Assuming you are talking about wages & salaries and expenditure then of course. It's only at the accounting stage, cash-flow, Incme V expenditure, etc that the two come togather.




Now you're conflating the transactions of a finance house, which is different to your previous separation of income v expenditure.

The Platform and the system are not the same thing. I have said nothing to lead anyone to conclude I am disputing that Horizon had bugs. In the transcript there is swerving from the Fujitsu staff saying it was down to an Oracle bug. The back end Finance system was SAP. Neither Oracle or SAP were a party to the claim. Additionally, both companies would have had limitation clauses in their terms and conditions. At that time both dominated their industries and had 10s of 1000s of customers using their application and database platforms. They were regarded the leaders in their respective areas. The problem is Roy, you have zero expertise in either the technical or the legal aspects which makes it hard for anyone to discuss it with you, particularly given your habit of accusations when someone disagrees with you.

 

[Roy Bloom]

The Platform and the system are not the same thing.

Of course they're not. I did differentiate between the two Maybe you didn't read it properly.

Thanks for those. But one issue jumps right, to me. If there was no problem with the system (and I'm referring to the whole platform and network), why was the Hoirizon system discontinued?

The system (for me) is the whole thing, the platform (hardware and software), the network, the remote terminals, even the operators could be included in "the system".
The platform is, as said: hardware and software. You could include the terminals or not, probably depending on if they were dumb terminals or not.

I have said nothing to lead anyone to conclude I am disputing that Horizon had bugs. In the transcript there is swerving from the Fujitsu staff saying it was down to an Oracle bug.

You clearly thought the bugs and errors were of no great consequence.

The issue is not that the system had bugs or gaps in the non-functional requirements. design and testing. The issue was the post office didn't trust the sub-postmasters, abused its powers of prosecution and control and destroyed people's lives.

You certainly gave me the impression that you thought the Post Office gave more weight to the human interaction it had with its staff, than the system design faults (again I'm referring to the whole system, not any one part of it.)

The back end Finance system was SAP. Neither Oracle or SAP were a party to the claim. Additionally, both companies would have had limitation clauses in their terms and conditions. At that time both dominated their industries and had 10s of 1000s of customers using their application and database platforms. They were regarded the leaders in their respective areas.

They didn't need to be. Fujitsu were the main contractors, and I assume it was Fujitsu who made the decision for system architecture, (Hardware especially) and sub-contracting the design of the SAP and Oracle software to appropriate software houses. (SAP may have been responsible for the desicion to use Oracle.)
The extent of a company's business may give the impression that they are the best, but only a fool would rely on that as a guide.
The PO and Fujitsu should have done their homewrok better.
But Fujitsu may have had previously excellent results with SAP and Oracle.
From the film it became clear that the major problem was the network outages and the repercussions of that. I would assume that the Post Office were responsible for the network and its reliability. If they couldn't do it , who could? Assuming they still had some control or communication over BT, or whoever the PO telephone system became.
Maybe their design brief to Fujitsu was more hope than reality. Maybe they said they could provide a reliable netwrork, and they failed to provide sufficient resilience.

As I said, the test may have yielded perfect results, but out in the field with network outages all sorts of peculiar things could happen.

The problem is Roy, you have zero expertise in either the technical or the legal aspects which makes it hard for anyone to discuss it with you, particularly given your habit of accusations when someone disagrees with you.

Aah bless, toys out the pram again?

 

[Roy Bloom]

Or Charlie Bronson

Yep, he's a kind of vendetta/revenge kind of guy.

 

[Mottie]

You can be snoopy, it suits your stalking mentatlity.

Okay Jim.

 

[motorbiking]

don't call him ***, you'll get in trouble.

 

[motorbiking]

Of course they're not. I did differentiate between the two Maybe you didn't read it properly.

The system (for me) is the whole thing, the platform (hardware and software), the network, the remote terminals, even the operators could be included in "the system".
The platform is, as said: hardware and software. You could include the terminals or not, probably depending on if they were dumb terminals or not.



You clearly thought the bugs and errors were of no great consequence.

You certainly gave me the impression that you thought the Post Office gave more weight to the human interaction it had with its staff, than the system design faults (again I'm referring to the whole system, not any one part of it.)



They didn't need to be. Fujitsu were the main contractors, and I assume it was Fujitsu who made the decision for system architecture, (Hardware especially) and sub-contracting the design of the SAP and Oracle software to appropriate software houses. (SAP may have been responsible for the desicion to use Oracle.)
The extent of a company's business may give the impression that they are the best, but only a fool would rely on that as a guide.
The PO and Fujitsu should have done their homewrok better.
But Fujitsu may have had previously excellent results with SAP and Oracle.
From the film it became clear that the major problem was the network outages and the repercussions of that. I would assume that the Post Office were responsible for the network and its reliability. If they couldn't do it , who could? Assuming they still had some control or communication over BT, or whoever the PO telephone system became.
Maybe their design brief to Fujitsu was more hope than reality. Maybe they said they could provide a reliable netwrork, and they failed to provide sufficient resilience.

As I said, the test may have yielded perfect results, but out in the field with network outages all sorts of peculiar things could happen.



Aah bless, toys out the pram again?

aww bless Roy
Your terminology and understanding, shows you have no idea. If you think Oracle and SAP created their database and ERP application based on a design spec from Fujitsu and that they somehow forgot to consider appropriate rollback of incomplete transactions in their underlying platforms, due to connection failure, you are showing that you are completely clueless. But the bugs in Horizon are irrelevant

This case has nothing to do with technical issues. It has everything to do with a cover up, breach of separation of duty, presumptions of computer evidence being correct, bad faith and systemic leadership failure that resulted in people's lives being ruined.

- more than 1800 business people experienced unexplained balance shortfalls
- The Post Office required the sub-postmasters to make good unexplained balance shortfalls
- Whether or not sub-postmasters made good unexplained shortfalls, the Post Office still prosecuted in many cases: for theft, false accounting and fraud. It followed up prosecutions with civil actions, all based on Horizon evidence.
- The government of the day rejected all complaints despite mounting evidence.

 

[foxhole]

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