The president can revise his military strategy but not his political situation. How does he get out of this mess? He probably cannot: there are several paths he could take, but they all lead to the same dead end.
Is Putin safe?
Some in the West seem to be putting their hopes on a coup that ousts Putin, but at present this seems unlikely.
The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was toppled by a political coup in 1964, but that was because the rules of the Communist Party created a mechanism for a leader’s removal.
Article 93 of the current Russian constitution allows for impeachment, but requires a two-thirds vote in both chambers of a parliament packed with political appointees. Many are opportunists who would throw Putin under a metro train if they felt it was in their interests and was safe to do, but so long as he controls the Federal Security Service (FSB), any such conspiracy would be nipped in the bud — and everyone knows that.
Perhaps the only institution that could oust Putin would be the army. However, as in Soviet times, the various security forces counter each other. The military have two elite divisions outside Moscow, but these are carefully watched by the FSB. Meanwhile, the National Guard has an oversized division in the capital, as well as a couple of regiments of Omon riot police. The separate Federal Protection Service controls the Kremlin Regiment. Any move by the military would be a bloody and contested affair. There are no indications to suggest that Putin is vulnerable.
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According to the respected analyst Tatiana Stanovaya, elements among Russia’s beleaguered and horrified business elite are suggesting that Russia buy its way out of the war, offering perhaps $150 billion in return for Crimea and the territories held by the rebel “people’s republics”. This war has never been about territory, though, but Russia’s status as a great power — and Putin’s status as a great ruler. To him, a great power takes what it feels it deserves, it does not haggle for it.
So Putin cannot back down. It is unlikely that he can lose, in the immediate sense of his forces being driven back over the border. For all the evident weaknesses on display, Russia still has the military advantage, and can if all else fails retrench in the east. But there is a difference between not being able to lose and winning. Any “victory” would be a Pyrrhic one, leading to an endless campaign against Ukrainian partisans, while struggling under the burden of unprecedented sanctions.
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In these circumstances, so long as the security forces remain disciplined and loyal it becomes difficult to organise any kind of co-ordinated protest, let alone challenge a powerful and vicious state. Most Russians will, as in the Brezhnev era, retreat into sullen disaffection, and those who can, will leave. For the Kremlin, this will be good enough: authoritarian regimes tend to rely on fearful apathy more than genuine enthusiasm.